In 1990, Spanish philosopher Jon Perez Laraudogoitia submitted an article to *Mind* entitled “This Article Should Not Be Rejected by *Mind*.” In it, he argued:

- If statement 1 in this argument is trivially true, then this article should be accepted.
- If statement 1 were false, then its antecedent (“statement 1 in this argument is trivially true”) would be true, which means that statement 1 itself would be true, a contradiction. So statement 1 must be true.
- But that seems wrong, since
*Mind*is a serious journal and shouldn’t publish trivial truths. - That means statement 1 must be either false or a non-trivial truth. We know it can’t be false (#2), so it must be a non-trivial truth, and its antecedent (“statement 1 in this argument is trivially true”) is false.
- What then is the truth value of its consequent, “this article should be accepted”? If this were false then
*Mind*shouldn’t publish the article; that can’t be right, since the article consists of a non-trivial truth and its justification. - So the consequent must be true, and
*Mind*should publish the article.

They published it. “This is, I believe, the first article in the whole history of philosophy the content of which is concerned exclusively with its own self, or, in other words, which is totally self-referential,” Laraudogoitia wrote. “The reason why it is published is because in it there is a proof that it should not be rejected and that is all.”